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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3718 
_____________ 
 
JOHN F. SIMPSON, t/a Warrior Ridge Trading; t/a LCT Pro Shop 
 
v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS 
& EXPLOSIVES; DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRY OPERATIONS, 
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & 
EXPLOSIVES; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
John F. Simpson, 
Appellant 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-15-mc-00297) 
______________ 
 
Argued October 30, 2018 
______________ 
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Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 3, 2019) 
 
Adam J. Kraut 
Joshua Prince  [ARGUED] 
Prince Law Offices  
646 Lenape Road 
Bechtelsville, PA 19505 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
David J. Freed 
United States Attorney 
Carlo D. Marchioli  [ARGUED] 
Kate L. Mershimer 
Office of United States Attorney 
228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754 
220 Federal Building and Courthouse 
Harrisburg, PA 17108 
 
Jeffrey A. Cohen 
ATF Associate Chief Counsel 
John Kevin White 
ATF Division Counsel 
601 Walnut Street, Suite 1000E 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
Counsel for Appellees  
                                              
 The Honorable Judge Vanaskie transmitted the opinion to the 
Clerk for filing prior to retiring from the bench on January 1, 2019. 
Due to the intervening holiday, the opinion has been entered on the 
docket by the Clerk this day. 
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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant John Simpson appeals the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment for Appellees and affirming 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives’ 
(“ATF”) revocation of his federal firearms licenses (“FFLs”).  
After an annual compliance investigation, the ATF determined 
that Simpson had committed over 400 willful violations of the 
Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (“GCA”), 
and therefore revoked his FFLs pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923(e) 
and 27 C.F.R. § 478.73.  After an administrative hearing, the 
ATF affirmed its revocation decision and Simpson filed a 
petition for judicial review under 18 U.S.C. § 923(f)(3).  The 
District Court, adopting a Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation, granted summary judgment in favor of the 
ATF.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
 Simpson’s appeal presents us with the question of what 
standard to apply to determine whether a violation of the GCA 
was willful, an issue we have not yet addressed in a 
precedential opinion.  In a non-precedential opinion, we found 
persuasive the willfulness standard used by seven other 
circuits:  knowledge of a legal obligation and purposeful 
disregard or plain indifference to it.  Taylor v. Hughes, 548 F. 
App’x 822, 824 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Borchardt Rifle Corp. v. 
Cook, 684 F.3d 1037, 1042 n.9 (10th Cir. 2012) (listing cases)).  
Agreeing with the unanimous view of all the Courts of Appeals 
to have addressed this issue, we now hold in this precedential 
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opinion that this willfulness standard applies to violations of 
the GCA.  Because it is clear that Simpson knew of and was 
plainly indifferent to his obligations by committing hundreds 
of GCA violations, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling.    
I. 
  Simpson applied for a dealer’s FFL in 2010, which 
prompted an ATF interview.  During the interview, ATF 
representatives discussed Simpson’s legal responsibilities and 
obligations as a firearms dealer, covering topics such as 
acquisition and disposition (“A&D”) recordkeeping, sales to 
law enforcement, out-of-state gun sales, prohibited sales, 
consignment of firearms, and personal firearms.   At the end of 
the meeting, Simpson signed an Acknowledgement of Federal 
Firearms Regulations, certifying that he understood his 
responsibility to learn and follow all laws and regulations 
governing his FFL.  Simpson subsequently received an FFL 
and opened a firearms store, Warrior Ridge Trading  
 In 2011, Simpson attended a seminar for FFL holders, 
where ATF officials discussed federal firearms regulations and 
showed sample Firearms Transaction Records.  In 2012, after 
consulting with the ATF about his desire to assemble AR-15 
rifles, Simpson applied for an additional FFL to manufacture 
firearms.  ATF officials met with him and discussed the legal 
responsibilities associated with a manufacturer’s license, 
including the duty to mark all manufactured firearms and to 
keep a separate manufacturing A&D book.    Simpson again 
signed an acknowledgement form certifying that he understood 
his legal obligations under his additional FFL. 
 In February 2014, Simpson applied to relocate his FFLs 
because he planned to move his firearms store to another 
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location.  An ATF Industry Operations Inspector (“IOI”) met 
with him and discussed his application.  Simpson once again 
signed a form acknowledging that he understood his 
responsibilities and obligations under the GCA.   
 In April 2014, ATF conducted a compliance inspection 
of Simpson’s FFLs pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(C).  ] 
According to IOI Susan Whitman, this inspection “was the 
worst [she] ever conducted,” and, based upon her report, the 
ATF decided to revoke Simpson’s FFLs.  (App. I 7).  Simpson 
requested a review of the revocation decision pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 923(f)(2) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.74.  After a hearing, 
ATF Director of Industry Operations (“DIO”) Juan Orellana 
found that Simpson had committed over 400 willful violations 
of the GCA.  As summarized by the Magistrate Judge, these 
violations include: 
[S]elling or delivering multiple 
firearms without having completed 
Firearm Transaction Records, 
ATF Forms 4473, and without 
Simpson making the required 
entries in his [A&D] Book; 
transferring firearms without 
conducting background checks; 
dealing firearms at the Alexandria 
Sportsman’s Club and in West 
Virginia without obtaining a 
license to do so; selling or 
delivering firearms, firearm 
frames, or firearm receivers in 
seven instances to individuals who 
did not live in Pennsylvania; 
incorrectly identifying in multiple 
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instances the firearms that had 
been transferred; failing to identify 
and mark 14 firearms that he 
manufactured, and failing to make 
the required records for those 
manufactured firearms; failing to 
record the disposition of five 
firearms to other licensees; failing 
to record the record of disposition 
of 30 firearms to non-licensees; 
failing on over 70 occasions to 
record required information in his 
A&D Book; failing in 
approximately 200 instances to 
record information on ATF Forms 
4473; failing to appropriately sign 
and date ATF Form 4473 in dozens 
of cases to indicate that he did not 
have reasonable cause to believe 
that a transferee was disqualified 
from receiving a firearm; and 
failing to submit an Annual 
Firearms Manufacturing and 
Exportation Report (ATF Form 
5300.11) in 2012 and 2013.  
(App. I 7-8; see also App. II 137-98).  As such, the ATF issued 
final revocation notices to Simpson.   
 Simpson then filed a petition for judicial review and 
moved for an emergency stay of the revocation of his FFLs. 
The District Court denied his motion, finding that Simpson was 
unlikely to “succe[ed] on the merits, given the numerosity and 
types of violations,” and because the court was not “persuaded 
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by [Simpson’s] contention that he was inadequately trained by 
[the ATF].”  (App. 9).  The case was then referred to a 
Magistrate Judge for pretrial management.  Upon completion 
of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. 
 Addressing the cross-motions in a Report and 
Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the 
ATF was authorized to revoke Simpson’s FFLs because he had 
willfully committed over 400 violations of the GCA.  (App. I 
33-34).  The District Court adopted the report and 
recommendation in its entirety, and thus granted summary 
judgment for the ATF and affirmed its revocation of Simpson’s 
FFLs.  Simpson’s timely appeal followed.   
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to review the ATF’s 
revocation decision under 18 U.S.C. § 923(f), 5 U.S.C. § 702, 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review over the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  See, e.g., Kelly 
v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).  A 
grant of summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  Further, an administrative record “enjoys a 
presumption of veracity” at summary judgment.  Am. Arms 
Int’l v. Herbert, 563 F.3d 78, 86 n.12 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted). 
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III. 
 Under the GCA, the ATF may revoke an FFL if the 
license holder willfully violated any provision of the GCA or 
any rule or regulation prescribed under the GCA.   18 U.S.C. 
§ 923(e); see also 27 C.F.R. § 478.73.  “A single willful 
violation [of the GCA] authorizes the ATF to revoke the 
violator’s FFL, regardless of how severe . . . .”  Fairmont Cash 
Mgmt., L.L.C. v. James, 858 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir. 2017).  
Thus, in the GCA context, our review of the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment requires us to determine whether 
there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
establishing even one willful violation of the GCA.  See Am. 
Arms, 563 F.3d at 86 (noting that “a single uncontested 
violation suffices to uphold” summary judgment for the ATF 
(citing Armalite, Inc. v. Lambert, 544 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 
2008))).   
 Eight other Courts of Appeals have held that a violation 
of the GCA is willful where the licensee knew of his legal 
obligation and purposefully disregarded or was plainly 
indifferent to the requirements.  See Borchardt Rifle, 684 F.3d 
at 1042; Fairmont Cash Mgmt., 858 F.3d at 362; Armalite, 544 
F.3d at 647; RSM, Inc. v. Herbert, 466 F.3d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 
2006); Article II Gun Shop, Inc. v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 492, 497 
(7th Cir. 2006); Willingham Sports, Inc. v. ATF, 415 F.3d 1274, 
1277 (11th Cir. 2005); Perri v. ATF, 637 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Lewin v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 268, 269 (8th Cir. 
1979).  We find this definition of willfulness to be appropriate.  
Indeed, this standard mirrors the willfulness standard we have 
applied in the parallel context of ATF revocations of fireworks 
and explosives licenses for violations of federal explosives 
laws.  See Vineland Fireworks Co. v. ATF, 544 F.3d 509, 517–
19 (upholding the ATF’s interpretation of willful because it 
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was reasonable).1    In Vineland, we upheld that willfulness 
“do[es] not require a bad purpose,” or an intent to disobey the 
law, but rather willfulness can be established by a mere 
“violation of the regulations with knowledge of their 
requirements.”  Id.  Moreover, both parties in this case agree 
with this willfulness standard.  Accordingly, we now join our 
sister circuits in holding that a violation of the GCA is willful 
where the licensee: (1) knew of his legal obligation under the 
GCA, and (2) either purposefully disregarded or was plainly 
indifferent to GCA requirements. 
Here, Simpson has been charged with willfully 
violating the GCA over 400 times.  He contends that he did not 
fully understand his obligations and that any violations he 
committed were not willful, but due to mistake or ignorance.  
We disagree, as the record indicates that Simpson was well 
apprised of his duties under the GCA but continually violated 
GCA recordkeeping, manufacturing, and sales requirements.   
 
                                              
 1 In Vineland, we deferred to the ATF’s interpretation 
of willfulness under federal explosives law because we found 
it reasonable.  See Vineland, 544 F.3d at 518 n.17.  Our review 
of explosives licensing decisions is governed only by 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706, so we apply Chevron deference to reasonable agency 
decisions.  See 18 U.S.C. § 843(e)(2); see also Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  In contrast, the GCA explicitly tasks courts with 
conducting de novo review of ATF licensing denials or 
revocations.  See 18 U.S.C. § 923(f)(3).  As such, we review 
district court decisions regarding ATF firearms licensing de 
novo.  See, e.g., Willingham Sports, 415 F.3d at 1275-76. 
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A. 
 The record shows that Simpson was informed of his 
obligations as an FFL licensee.  For example, Simpson met 
with ATF officials three times about his FFLs and, at the 
conclusion of each meeting, he signed a form acknowledging 
that he discussed various regulatory topics with the ATF.  In 
addition, Simpson attended an ATF seminar for FFL holders 
where he learned more about his obligations under the GCA.   
The record also demonstrates that Simpson often 
complied with GCA requirements.  On numerous occasions, 
Simpson lawfully sold firearms and fully completed the A&D 
recordkeeping required under the GCA.  Also, he applied to 
relocate his FFL, demonstrating that he knew that he was only 
allowed to sell firearms from his approved FFL location.  His 
full compliance with GCA requirements in some instances 
belies his assertion that he did not understand those 
requirements. 
  Further, some of Simpson’s actions illustrate that he 
understood the GCA regulatory scheme quite well.  For 
example, he sometimes transferred firearms from his FFL 
inventory to his personal collection, thereby taking advantage 
of a statutory loophole that allowed him to later sell the 
firearms at gun shows without conducting background checks.  
Such action is inconsistent with that of a person who does not 
understand the GCA regulatory scheme.  Accordingly, we find 
that no reasonable fact-finder could disagree that Simpson 
knew and understood his GCA obligations as an FFL licensee.    
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B. 
 In this case, the ATF has alleged that Simpson was 
plainly indifferent to the GCA’s  requirements.  We must 
therefore determine what constitutes plain indifference under 
the willfulness standard we have adopted.   
Plain indifference is demonstrated by “a lack of concern 
for [GCA] regulations. . . .”  Am. Arms Int’l, 563 F.3d at 87.  A 
lack of concern may be shown by circumstantial evidence—
such as repeated violations or a large quantity of violations.  
See, e.g., Borchardt Rifle, 684 F.3d at 1043–44; Am. Arms 
Int’l, 563 F.3d at 87; On Target Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Att’y 
Gen., 472 F.3d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 2007); RSM, Inc., 466 F.3d 
at 322; Willingham Sports, 415 F.3d at 1277. 
 The ATF charged Simpson with willfully violating a 
long list of separate provisions of the GCA under his 
manufacturer’s FFL, including, inter alia:   
(a) selling firearms without completing Form 4473s; 
(b) selling or delivering firearms without recording the 
disposition in his A&D book;  
(c) transferring firearms without conducting 
background checks;  
(d) dealing firearms outside of his FFL premises;  
(e) selling or delivering firearms to non-Pennsylvania 
residents;  
(f) transferring firearms and misidentifying 
corresponding A&D entries;  
(g) failing to identify and mark manufactured firearms;  
(h) failing to record the manufacture of firearms in his 
A&D book;  
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(i) failing to record dispositions of firearms to FFL 
holders and non-licensees;  
(j) failing to complete all fields of Form 4473s; and  
(k) failing to sign and date Form 4473s.   
(See App. I 8).  Additionally, the ATF charged Simpson with 
willfully violating another series of provisions of the GCA 
under his dealer’s FFL.  These include, inter alia: 
(a) selling firearms without completing Form 4473s; 
(b) selling or delivering firearms without recording the 
disposition in his A&D book; 
(c) transferring firearms without conducting 
background checks; 
(d) selling firearms in West Virginia; 
(e) selling or delivering firearms to non-Pennsylvania 
residents 
(f) purchasing firearms without recording the purchases 
in his A&D book; 
(g) failing to complete all fields of Form 4473s; and 
(h) failing to sign and date Form 4473s. 
Id.   
Simpson contends that all of these violations either were 
mere mistakes or were due to his “fundamental 
misunderstanding as to the importance” of GCA recordkeeping 
requirements.  (Appellant’s Br. 35).  However, in view of the 
fact that Simpson received training on his obligations and 
explicitly acknowledged that he understood his GCA 
obligations, the sheer number and continuing nature of the 
violations clearly demonstrate Simpson’s plain indifference to 
the GCA’s requirements.   
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 While there is no dispute that Simpson violated the 
GCA on numerous occasions, there is also evidence of other 
firearms transactions in which Simpson fully complied with 
GCA requirements by completing, signing, and dating Form 
4473s, recording the dispositions in his A&D book, and 
conducting background checks.  This inconsistent conduct 
suggests both that Simpson knew of his obligations and was 
indifferent to complying with them.  Moreover, there is 
evidence of blatant GCA violations.  For example, Simpson 
routinely transferred receivers to out-of-state residents—in 
clear violation of the GCA—but falsely recorded the transfers 
as rifle sales in his A&D book, making these transactions 
appear lawful.  Such behavior is indicative of Simpson’s lack 
of concern for his GCA obligations as an FFL holder.   
 In sum, the record sufficiently shows that Simpson had 
knowledge of his FFL obligations, yet acted plainly 
indifferently to them, thus willfully violating the GCA. 
Accordingly, we find that the ATF was authorized to revoke 
Simpson’s FFLs. 
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the ATF, 
affirming its revocation of Simpson’s FFLs.   
